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This Article is about what malice should mean under bankruptcy law. 
Malice is used in other areas of law as a sorting function—to identify 
wrongful acts that are especially grievous. For example, criminal law 
uses malice to separate murder from manslaughter. The Bankruptcy 
Code uses malice to perform a similar sorting function. Bankruptcy law 
discharges or forgives certain kinds of debts. It separates debts that 
society is willing to forgive from debts that are not forgivable. One way 
it accomplishes this sorting function is through Section 523(a)(6) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts for “willful and 
malicious injury by the debtor.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted the word malicious to require “a
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.” But 
neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have provided 
meaningful guidance on the degree of wrongfulness that is required. 
Because intentionally injuring another is inherently a wrongful act, 
there should be a difference between a mere willful injury and the 
required “willful and malicious” injury. In addition, a circuit court split 
has developed on whether malicious requires intent, and if so, what 
level of intent. This Article seeks to clarify the meaning of malicious. It 
explains why courts should stop construing malicious to require intent. 
It also recommends the definition of malicious be changed to require 
an “extraordinarily” wrongful act so that malice can accomplish its 
sorting function.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores what malice should mean under bankruptcy law. 
Malice is utilized in other areas of law as a sorting function—to identify 
wrongful acts that are especially grievous. For example, criminal law uses 
malice to separate murder from manslaughter.1 Tort law employs malice to 
                                                                                                                     
1 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2012) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought.”), with id. § 1112(a) (“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing 
of a human being without malice.”). See generally 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 139, 153 (15th ed. 1994) (stating that at common law and by statute in 
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describe conduct that justifies imposing punitive damages.2 The Bankruptcy 
Code uses malice to perform a similar sorting function. Bankruptcy law 
discharges certain kinds of debts.3 It separates debts that society is willing to 
forgive from those that are not forgivable. One way bankruptcy law 
accomplishes this sorting function is through exceptions to the bankruptcy 
discharge.
Victims of a debtor’s bad conduct occasionally request bankruptcy courts 
to not discharge the debts owed to them. Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy 
Code excepts from discharge debts “for willful and malicious injury by the 
debtor.”4 The Supreme Court has interpreted the word malicious to require “a
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.”5
The Bankruptcy Reporter is crowded with examples of debtors who 
intentionally engaged in wrongful acts without a just cause or excuse. For 
instance, one debtor took his former girlfriend’s Ferrari and hid it despite 
demands to return the car.6 Another debtor put his car in reverse and 
intentionally collided it into a vehicle that was directly behind him.7 One debtor 
sexually harassed an employee.8 Another violated a non-compete agreement by 
                                                                                                                     
many states, “murder is an unlawful homicide with malice aforethought” and “manslaughter 
is an unlawful homicide without malice aforethought”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
765–66 (5th ed. 2010) (providing a history of murder and observing that “it will not solve 
modern homicide cases to say simply that murder is the unlawful killing of another with 
malice aforethought, that manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice 
aforethought, and that no crime is committed if the killing is lawful”); MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210.2 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980) (explaining that the phrase 
malice aforethought is “used by judges to signify any of a number of mental states deemed 
sufficient to support liability for murder”); Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Modern Status of the 
Rules Requiring Malice “Aforethought,” “Deliberation,” or “Premeditation,” as Elements 
of Murder in the First Degree, 18 A.L.R.4th 961, 962–64 (1982) (discussing the current 
status of murder laws).
2 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9–10 (5th ed. 
1984) (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive 
damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ 
or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate 
disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.”) 
(citations omitted).
3 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2012) (“Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a 
discharge under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose 
before the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”).
4 Id. § 523(a)(6).
5 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 
107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez (In re Rodriguez), 568 B.R. 328, 346 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2017) (holding it was malicious).
7 Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 228 B.R. 899, 902, 910 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding it was malicious).
8 Ganci v. Townsend (In re Townsend), 550 B.R. 220, 228 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(“[T]he factual findings in the District Court Action are sufficient to show that Defendant’s 
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poaching clients from his former employer.9 One debtor recklessly shot a 
paintball gun in a residential neighborhood and injured someone.10 Prior to 
surrendering his truck to his lender, one debtor used his key to scratch the paint, 
removed the “F-150” emblems, and smashed the dashboard interface screen.11
Another debtor posted nude photographs of a woman, along with her home 
address, on a revenge porn site.12 One debtor drove his vehicle twelve miles per 
hour over the speed limit and ran a red light (which was determined to not be 
malicious),13 while a different debtor was found to have been malicious when 
he crept his car forward at a speed of one to two miles per hour toward a 
construction flagman, expecting him to get out of the way.14
These examples illustrate the variety of bad acts that some debtors commit. 
The Bankruptcy Code was designed to use malice as a way to separate bad acts 
that are forgivable from those that are not.15 The challenge with using malice to 
sort bad acts comes from the way the Supreme Court has defined it.16 Simply 
requiring a “wrongful act” is overinclusive because intentionally injuring 
another is inherently a wrongful act.17 Neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit 
                                                                                                                     
conduct was malicious: he subjected Plaintiff to severe or pervasive sexual harassment and 
his wrongful behavior was ‘without just cause or excuse.’”).
9 Patriot Fire Prot., Inc. v. Fuller (In re Fuller), 560 B.R. 881, 889 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2016) (finding it was malicious and stating “[t]he Debtor had worked in the fire-protection 
industry for nearly ten years before the events at issue here, and therefore would have 
understood how precious each client is to a business engaged in that industry, and how 
poaching clients necessarily caused harm to [his former employer] in that the client would 
no longer need [his former employer’s] services.”).
10 Manna v. Havranek (In re Havranek), No. 97-B-30745, 2000 WL 277171, at *2–3
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2000) (holding it was not malicious).
11 Veridian Credit Union v. Lampe (In re Lampe), Bankr. No. 16-00590, Adv. No. 16-
09034, 2017 WL 6568050, at *2, *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 22, 2017) (finding the debtor 
acted maliciously in damaging the truck).
12 Hoewischer v. White (In re White), 551 B.R. 814, 818, 823 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2016) 
(holding it was malicious).
13 Tso v. Nevarez (In re Nevarez), 415 B.R. 540, 544–45 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) 
(“[R]eckless driving does not rise to the level of willful and malicious intent necessary to a 
non-dischargeability action . . . .”).
14 Hough v. Margulies (In re Margulies), 541 B.R. 156, 159–60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“[The debtor] tried to veer to the left and drive around [the flagman] but traffic in that lane 
prevented him from doing so. [The debtor] continued to move forward expecting [the 
flagman] to get out of his way but [the flagman] held his ground, in [the debtor’s] view, 
‘simply to annoy’ him. [The debtor] continued to roll forward toward [the flagman], and did 
not apply his brakes until after he hit [the flagman].”).
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012).
16 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) (defining malice to require “a 
wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse” (quoting Bromage v. Prosser 
(1825), 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255)).
17 See id. at 486 (quoting Bromage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. at 255); 
see also Viener v. Jacobs (In re Jacobs), 381 B.R. 128, 139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (“In some 
sense, then, a judicial liability determination is always based on ‘wrongful’ conduct.”).
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courts have provided meaningful guidance on the degree of wrongfulness that 
is required.18
Defining malice to require a wrongful act does separate acts that are wrong 
from those that are not. The problem is not all debts associated with a wrongful 
act should be excepted from discharge. In other words, debts related to some 
wrongful acts should be discharged in bankruptcy. For example, it may be a 
wrongful act for a debtor to intentionally refuse to pay a valid medical bill 
despite having sufficient funds to do so. But that type of wrongful act does not 
justify excepting the medical bill from the bankruptcy discharge.19
Consequently, the current definition of malicious does not separate among 
wrongful acts—it merely sorts acts that are wrong from those that are not. In 
order to properly sort, the definition of malicious should enable courts to 
segregate wrongful acts. 
When applying the definition of malicious, many circuit courts have turned 
from the “wrongful act” element to the “done intentionally” requirement in an 
effort to accomplish the sorting function. They have split in the way they treat 
this intent-based requirement of malicious.20 Complicating things further, in 
1998 the Supreme Court held that the term “willful” in § 523(a)(6) requires “a
deliberate or intentional injury.”21 This created overlap among the intent-based 
elements of the statutory terms “willful” and “malicious.” The overlap among 
the Supreme Court’s definitions of willful and malicious has not been 
reconciled.22
This Article begins by looking at the origin and development of the term 
malicious in bankruptcy legislation and Supreme Court opinions. It also 
summarizes the limited scholarship on the meaning of malicious. It explains 
why courts should stop construing malicious to require intent. It then explores 
the way criminal and tort law determine wrongfulness and highlights the utility 
of the comparison method that is used for the tort of negligence. In harmony 
with this comparative technique, this Article recommends the definition of 
malicious in § 523(a)(6) be changed to require an “extraordinarily” wrongful act 
so that it accomplishes its sorting function. 
                                                                                                                     
18 Viener, 381 B.R. at 139 (“There is surprisingly little judicial and scholarly 
commentary discussing the degree or nature of ‘wrongfulness’ that constitutes ‘malice’ 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).”); Forrest v. Bressler (In re Bressler), 387 B.R. 446, 455 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
19 Cf. Perry v. Norfolk (In re Norfolk), 29 B.R. 377, 379 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(“Failure to pay is not willful or malicious injury, otherwise all debtors would be subject to 
exception to discharge.”).
20 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
21 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
22 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
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II. BACKGROUND OF MALICE IN BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION, SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS, AND SCHOLARSHIP
This Part explores the historical development of the term “malicious”
throughout statutory bankruptcy law and Supreme Court decisions. It also 
highlights the limited scholarly attention on the meaning of malicious.
A. Chronological Development of the Term “Malicious” in Bankruptcy 
Legislation
Neither the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,23 the Bankruptcy Act of 1841,24 nor 
the Bankruptcy Act of 186725 contained the word “malicious.” The term first 
appeared as an exception to discharge in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.26
Legislative history provides minimal insight on the meaning of “malicious.”
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were substantially derived 
from the Torrey Bankrupt Bill, which was amended, adopted and recommended 
to Congress for enactment at the second session of the National Convention of 
the Representatives of Commercial Bodies of the United States in 1889.27 As 
                                                                                                                     
23 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). This act was primarily a 
creditor remedy against merchant debtors. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995).
24 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The Bankruptcy Act of 
1841 was modeled after the Massachusetts Insolvency Law of 1838. CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 70 (1935); Tabb, supra note 23, at 17.
25 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
26 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978) (“A 
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such 
as . . . are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretenses or false 
representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.” 
(emphasis added)).
27 See Proceedings of the Second Session of the National Convention of the 
Representatives of the Commercial Bodies (Sept. 3–4, 1889), (transcript available at 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112102350354;view=1up;seq=7;size=125)
[https://perma.cc/9FKT-MRPA] (including the text of the Torrey Bankruptcy Bill to 
establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States, as amended, 
adopted, and recommended to Congress for enactment); see also Bradley Hansen, 
Commercial Associations and the Creation of a National Economy: The Demand for Federal 
Bankruptcy Law, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 86 (1998) (exploring how merchants and manufacturers 
used commercial associations to organize and lobby for a federal bankruptcy law).
[A] young lawyer living in St. Louis who had distinguished himself for his ability and 
great learning touching the bankruptcy laws in this country took an interest in this 
question, and at once his marked ability was recognized and he was made chairman of 
three national conventions to consider the question. I refer to Judge Jay L. Torrey, then 
a resident of St. Louis. . . .
. . . .
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originally recommended by that convention, the Torrey Bankrupt Bill contained 
only three exceptions to discharge.28 A willful and malicious injury was not one 
of them.29
The Torrey Bankrupt Bill and several other bankruptcy-related bills were 
introduced in and rejected by Congress during the ten-year period before the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted.30 The bills involved several disputed 
topics such as concerns over the cost of bankruptcy administration, whether 
bankruptcy should be voluntary or involuntary, and what the scope of the 
discharge should be.31 An 1893 report from the House of Representatives 
demonstrates the concern over both a voluntary bankruptcy system and the 
scope of the discharge:
The part of a bankruptcy law most difficult to draft is its voluntary provisions; 
they must not only provide relief for the honest bankrupt, but they must refuse 
relief or encouragement to the dishonest bankrupt. It would be quite easy to 
write a bill saying that the court should grant applications for discharges; the 
passage of such a law would result in good honest poor men getting discharges, 
and in so far it would be a good law, but it would also enable a lot of rascals to 
escape the payment of just debts, and in that respect it would be a bad law. The 
fact that all debtors might get a discharge, without the possibility of the 
interference of their creditors, would curtail credits and do untold harm to all 
of the members of that great class who conduct their various transactions on 
credit, and in that respect also would be a bad law. All of the scandals under 
the old law grew out of proceedings under its provisions for voluntary 
bankruptcy.
                                                                                                                     
. . . At the Minneapolis convention, on motion of one of the delegates, the bill was 
named the “Torrey bill” in honor of this young man. He is now the speaker of the 
Wyoming legislature, a man of ability, modesty, and character.
28 CONG. REC. 5, 4535 (1896).
28 A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt, not a joint stock company or a 
corporation, from all of his provable debts, except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by 
the United States, the State, or municipality in which he resides; (2) have not been duly 
scheduled in time for allowance, with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, 
unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy, or (3) were 
created by his fraud, embezzlement, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any 
fiduciary capacity.
Torrey Bankrupt Bill, H.R. 3316, 51st Cong. § 53 (1889).
29 See id.
30 The Torrey Bankrupt Bill was originally introduced in the House of Representatives 
on December 20, 1889 by the Honorable Ezra B. Taylor, of Ohio, Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, as H.R. Bill 3316. It was introduced on several other occasions and was rejected 
several times. See 28 CONG. REC. 4678 (1896); 28 CONG. REC. 601 (1896); 25 CONG. REC.
124 (1893); 21 CONG. REC. 10208 (1890); see also Hansen, supra note 27, at 103–04
(summarizing several introductions and rejections of the Torrey bill).
31 H.R. REP. No. 55-65, at 35–36 (1897) (voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy); id. at 
44–47 (administrative expenses); see also H.R. REP. No. 53-67, at 5 (1893).
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The only ways yet discovered to keep the frauds under a voluntary law 
down to the minimum, are to make it possible for parties in interest to interfere, 
by commencing involuntary proceedings, before the fraudulent plans have 
been consummated and the property secreted or wasted, to provide adequate 
punishment for fraudulent acts, and to refuse a discharge to dishonest 
bankrupts.
The measure in question is an imperfect voluntary bill. It is not provided 
with effective safeguards for the protection of the rights of honest debtors or 
honest creditors, but is calculated to encourage every wrong which is known 
to rascals.32
The congressional floor debates on the various bankruptcy bills from 1893 
to 1894 do not mention an exception to discharge for a willful and malicious 
injury.33 None of the bankruptcy bills that were introduced in December 1895 
and January 1896 contained an exception to discharge for a willful and 
malicious injury.34
Section 16(a)(2) of a bankruptcy bill introduced in April of 1896 contained 
an exception to discharge for “judgments in actions for frauds or willful and 
malicious injuries to the person or property of another.”35 In 1897, the House 
passed a bill primarily derived from the Torrey Bankrupt Bill, and the Senate 
passed a different bankruptcy-related bill.36 A conference committee was 
established to produce a compromise bill.37 The House Report explains: 
[S]ince the Torrey bill was first introduced in Congress it has undergone very 
many changes friendly in character. Each Committee on the Judiciary in three 
successive Congresses has made changes in this bill, growing out of full 
discussion and much thought devoted to the question. Judge Torrey himself 
                                                                                                                     
32 H.R. REP. No. 53-206, at 22 (1893) (emphasis added).
33 See 26 CONG. REC. 7547–64 (1894); 25 CONG. REC. 3003–34 (1893); id. at 2966–70; 
id. at 2866–80; id. at 2825–36; id. at 2798–2816; id. at 2777–90.
34 See H.R. 3956, 54th Cong. (1st Sess. 1896); H.R. 3550, 54th Cong. (1st Sess. 1896); 
H.R. 2913, 54th Cong. (1st Sess. 1895); H.R. 259, 54th Cong. (1st Sess. 1895). “We have 
made many changes in almost every section from the original Torrey bill. I do not say we
alone, but refer to the other committees that have treated it, and to ripe suggestions made by 
Judge Torrey himself.” 28 CONG. REC. 4539 (1896).
35 H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, Exhibit C, at 29 (1896) (attaching H.R. 8110 introduced by 
Mr. Henderson Apr. 10, 1896).
36 Id. at 1 (“Several bills have been introduced at this session and referred to the 
committee, namely: H.R. 13, H.R. 259, H.R. 1203, H.R. 2913, H.R. 3550, H.R. 3956, and 
H.R. 7446. In lieu of all of these the committee recommends the passage of H.R. 8110, which 
appears as Exhibit C to this report. All of these bills, excepting those which provide only for 
voluntary bankruptcy, are based upon and are substantially what is known in the country as 
the Torrey bill.”). Knute Nelson sponsored the simple bankruptcy bill in the Senate; David 
Henderson sponsored the version of the Torrey bill in the House. 31 CONG. REC. 6296 
(1898); see also S. DOC. No. 54-101, at 1–2 (1897); H.R. REP. No. 55-65, at 28 (1897).
37 S. REP. No. 55-294, at 1 (1898) (Conf. Rep.).
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has suggested many changes since the first bill was framed, and has ever been 
ready to cooperate with those having the subject in charge to perfect the bill.
The bill which this committee recommends (H.R. 8110) has for its basis 
the Torrey bill, with the friendly amendments that have been made as above 
indicated, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the present Congress has 
spent many weeks in subcommittee and full committee in considering the bill 
by sections, and still perfecting it according to its best judgment to meet the 
needs of the country, and in doing this the committee has not failed to note and 
take advantage of all just criticisms that have come to its notice.38
On July 1, 1898, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted.39 It labeled the 
exceptions to discharge as “Debts Not Affected by a Discharge” and stated in 
§ 17(a)(2) that: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of 
his provable debts, except such as . . . are judgments in actions . . . for willful 
and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.”40 Five years later, 
the term “judgments” was replaced with the word “liabilities.”41 The purpose of 
this amendment was to broaden the scope of debts excepted from discharge 
beyond those debts that had been reduced to a judgment.42
In 1970, § 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended to add an 
exception to discharge “for willful and malicious conversion of the property of 
another.”43 The amendment also added a new § 17(a)(8) clause on “liabilities 
for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another other than 
conversion as excepted under clause (2) of this subdivision.”44
The Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978 updated the exception to 
discharge to include the newly defined term “entity” and moved it to § 523(a)(6) 
as follows: “any debt . . . for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
another entity or to the property of another entity.”45 In 1979, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
38 H.R. REP. No. 54-1228, at 1 (1896).
39 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
40 Id. § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. at 550.
41 See Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 797–98 (amending the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898). The amended language read: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a 
bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . (2) are liabilities . . . for willful 
and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.” Id.
42 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (discussing the 1903 amendment to 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898); Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1920). The 1903 
amendment also added language excepting liabilities “for seduction of an unmarried female, 
or for criminal conversation.” Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 798.
43 Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 5, 84 Stat. 990, 992 (amending § 17(a)(2) 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
44 Id. § 6 (adding a new § 17(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
45 Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549, 
2590–91 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012)). A House Report relating to the 
Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978 stated “‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To 
the extent that Tinker v. Colwell held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that 
other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are 
1032 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:6
noted that “[d]ischarge provisions substantially similar to § 17 of the [1898 Act] 
appear in § 523 of the new law.”46 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 retained the identical language of the 1978 
Act in § 523(a)(6).47 As the foregoing summary shows, legislative history 
provides limited help in determining the meaning of malicious. 
B. The Three Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the Term
“Malicious”
Over the course of three decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
statutory term “malicious” to require a wrongful act that is done intentionally 
without just cause or excuse.48 The determination of whether an act is wrongful 
is made from an objective perspective49 and the circumstances surrounding a 
debtor’s act must be considered in determining whether it was wrongful.50 The 
cases are addressed in chronological order.
1. Tinker v. Colwell (1904)
The first one, Tinker v. Colwell, was decided six years after the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898 was enacted.51 In Tinker, a creditor obtained a money judgment 
against a debtor for the debtor’s criminal conversation with the creditor’s wife.52
Criminal conversation was a husband’s civil cause of action in tort against a 
man who engaged in sexual intercourse with the husband’s wife.53 At that time, 
even if the wife consented to the act the husband had “personal and exclusive 
rights with regard to the person of his wife” and “such an act on the part of 
another man constitut[ed] an assault.”54 The Tinker Court considered the 
                                                                                                                     
overruled.” H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977) (citation omitted). A Senate Report was 
similar. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978). For an analysis of the impact of these reports, see 
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions 
and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 76–78 (1990).
46 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 129 n.1 (1979) (addressing res judicata principles). 
47 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, § 215, 119 Stat. 54, 54 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)). 
48 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1934); McIntyre v. 
Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1916); Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) 
(quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
49 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 487 (quoting In re Freche, 109 F. 620 (D. N.J. 1901)).
50 McIntyre, 242 U.S. at 142; Davis, 293 U.S. at 332–33.
51 Tinker, 193 U.S. 473.
52 Id. at 480.
53 Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 125 (1883); Oppenheim v. Kridel, 140 N.E. 
227, 228–29 (N.Y. 1923); Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 651, 654–58 (1930).
54 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 481.
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debtor’s act “an injury to the person and also to the property rights of the 
husband” because it violated the exclusive marital rights of the husband.55
To give meaning to the word “malicious,” the Tinker Court quoted the 
following 1825 English case of Bromage v. Prosser, which involved the tort of 
slander, as providing a “good definition of the legal meaning of the word 
malice”:
Malice, in common acceptation, means ill will against a person, but in 
its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just 
cause or excuse. If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce 
death, I do it of malice, because I do it intentionally and without just 
cause or excuse. If I maim cattle, without knowing whose they are, if I 
poison a fishery, without knowing the owner, I do it of malice, because
it is a wrongful act, and done intentionally. If I am arraigned of felony, 
and willfully stand mute, I am said to do it of malice, because it is 
intentional and without just cause or excuse. And if I traduce a man, 
whether I know him or not and whether I intend to do him an injury or 
not, I apprehend the law considers it as done of malice, because it is 
wrongful and intentional. It equally works an injury, whether I meant to 
produce an injury or not.56
The Tinker Court’s adoption of the Bromage definition established the 
requirement of a wrongful act. In determining if an act was wrongful, the Tinker
Court focused on the nature of the act and provided examples such as a person 
giving a blow likely to produce death to a perfect stranger, maiming cattle, and
poisoning a fishery.57 The nature of the act under consideration in Tinker was 
criminal conversation. The Tinker Court observed that “[t]he law will, as we 
think, imply that degree of malice in an act of the nature under consideration, 
which is sufficient to bring it within the [exception to discharge].”58 In 
determining wrongfulness, the Tinker Court looked to the federal district court 
decision of In re Freche, which involved a judgment in favor of a father whose 
daughter had been seduced by a debtor. 
The Tinker Court quoted In re Freche, which explained that the act in that 
case was malicious “because the injurious consequences which followed the 
wrongful act were those which might naturally be expected to result from it, and 
which [the debtor] must be presumed to have had in mind when he committed 
the offence [sic].”59 The Tinker definition also established that the wrongfulness 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. at 485.
56 Id. at 485–86 (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. 
& Cress. 247, 255).
57 Id. at 486 (quoting Bromage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. at 255).
58 Id. at 486.
59 Id. (quoting In re Freche, 109 F. 620, 621 (D.N.J. 1901)).
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of an act is not a subjective inquiry viewed from the debtor’s perspective.60 The 
Tinker Court continued quoting In re Freche, including language about “what 
any man of reasonable intelligence must have known to be contrary to his 
duty.”61 The phrases “presumed to have had in mind” and “must have known”
establish that the determination of whether an act is wrongful is from an 
objective perspective, not a subjective one.62 Determining wrongfulness from 
an objective perspective is supported further by the Tinker Court’s summary of 
United States v. Reed, where it explained that “a malignant spirit or a specific 
intention to hurt a particular person is not an essential element.”63 For the injury 
of criminal conversation, the Tinker Court concluded that “personal and 
particular malice towards the husband as an individual need not be shown, for 
the law implies that there must be malice in the very act itself . . . .”64 Thus, 
based on the nature of certain acts, wrongfulness is implied. 
2. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh (1916)
In 1916, the Court addressed the meaning of malice in the context of a 
conversion claim.65 McIntyre v. Kavanaugh involved a debtor who was a partner 
at a financial brokerage.66 The brokerage received some stock certificates to 
hold as security for a loan.67 The brokerage sold the stocks without authority 
and used the sale proceeds for its own purposes.68 The debtor did not participate 
in the brokerage’s sale of the stock, but as a partner, he was “individually 
responsible for torts by [the brokerage].”69 The McIntyre Court observed that 
“[i]f under the circumstances here presented the [brokerage] inflicted a wilful 
and malicious injury to property, of course, [the debtor] incurred liability for 
that character of wrong.”70
In determining whether the nature of the act was wrongful, the McIntyre
Court noted that “[t]o deprive another of his property forever by deliberately 
disposing of it without semblance of authority is certainly an injury.”71 The 
McIntyre Court rejected the argument that the phrase willful and malicious 
injury did not include conversion and found “no sufficient reason for such a 
                                                                                                                     
60 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 486–87 (quoting Bromage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1054, 4 Barn. & 
Cress. at 255).
61 Id. at 487 (quoting Freche, 109 F. at 621).
62 Id. at 486–87 (quoting Freche, 109 F. at 621).
63 Id. at 487 (citing United States v. Reed, 86 F. 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1897)). This 
language from Tinker is about the statutory term malicious, not the term willful. Id. at 489–
90.
64 Id. at 490.
65 McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916).
66 Id. at 138–39.
67 Id. at 138.
68 Id. at 138–39.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 139.
71 McIntyre, 242 U.S. at 141.
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narrow construction.”72 The McIntyre Court then quoted Tinker and reaffirmed 
that “an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and 
which necessarily causes injury . . . may be said to be done willfully and 
maliciously.”73 Accordingly, even though the McIntyre Court never mentioned 
why the brokerage disposed of the stock, it concluded that “[t]he circumstances 
disclosed suffice to show a wilful and malicious injury to property for which 
[the debtor] became and remains liable to respond in damages.”74
3. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. (1934)
In 1934, the Court addressed the meaning of malice in another conversion 
case.75 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. involved a debtor who was a car dealer.76
The debtor borrowed money to buy a car to resell, giving the lender a chattel 
mortgage and agreeing to hold the car as the property of the lender “for the 
purpose of storage, and not to sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of it except upon 
consent in writing.”77 The debtor then sold the car without the lender’s written 
consent.78 The debtor testified that “notice of the transaction was given the same 
day to one of the [lender’s] officers.”79 There was also testimony “support[ing] 
the inference that on many other occasions cars held upon like terms had been 
sold [by the debtor] without express consent.”80
After citing McIntyre, the Davis Court explained that not every act of 
conversion amounted to a willful and malicious injury.81 The circumstances 
must be considered.82 In determining if the debtor’s act was sufficiently 
wrongful, the Davis Court clarified that “[t]here may be an honest, but mistaken 
belief, engendered by a course of dealing, that powers have been enlarged or 
incapacities removed. In these and like cases, what is done is a tort, but not a 
wilful and malicious one.”83 Thus, the circumstances surrounding a debtor’s act 
influence the determination of wrongfulness.84 The Davis Court concluded that 
                                                                                                                     
72 Id. (“Why, for example, should a bankrupt who had stolen a watch escape payment 
of damages but remain obligated for one maliciously broken?”).
73 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487 (1904)).
74 Id. at 142.
75 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).





81 Davis, 293 U.S. at 332.
82 Id.
83 Id. The Davis Court then concluded that the trial court’s special findings 
“unmistakably excluded” willfulness and malice because the trial court made a finding that 
the debtor was “not actuated by willful, malicious or criminal intent in disposing of the car.” 
Id.
84 Id. at 332–33.
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“a showing of conversion without aggravated features” was not sufficiently 
wrongful.85
The Tinker, McIntyre, and Davis opinions established that an act is wrongful 
based on its nature having injurious consequences. It must also have aggravated 
features.86 Wrongfulness is determined from an objective perspective based on 
the surrounding circumstances.87
C. Scholarly Attention on the Meaning of Malicious Has Been Limited
Few scholars have grappled with the meaning of malice and none have 
focused on the degree of wrongfulness that should be required to constitute 
malice. Professor Charles J. Tabb wrote an influential article on collateral 
conversions in 1990.88 He interpreted the then-existing circuit split on collateral 
conversions as having four different approaches: the special malice test, the 
implied malice test, the targeted-at-the-creditor test, and the totality-of-the-
circumstances test.89 In the context of collateral conversions, he proposed a 
“knowing violation” test which focused on whether a debtor knew that the 
conversion of the secured creditor’s collateral violated the creditor’s rights.90
Some scholars have focused on breach of contract claims.91 Others argue 
that the best approach is the one taken by the Ninth Circuit, which requires the 
debtor’s conduct to constitute an intentional tort as defined by state law.92 One 
                                                                                                                     
85 Id. at 333.
86 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 490 (1904).
87 Davis, 293 U.S. at 332.
88 Tabb, supra note 45, at 56.
89 Id. at 78–89 (describing the special malice test as requiring “an actual subjective 
intent on the part of the debtor to injure or harm the creditor,” the implied malice test as 
focusing on whether the debtor knows that an unauthorized conversion is violative of the 
secured creditor’s rights, the targeted-at-the-creditor test as looking at whether the debtor’s 
willful conduct is targeted at the creditor “at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or 
almost certain to cause financial harm,” and the totality-of-the-circumstances test as 
“mak[ing] the determination of malice by looking at the totality of the circumstances” 
(citations omitted)).
90 Id. at 104.
91 See, e.g., Scott F. Norberg, Contract Claims and the “Willful and Malicious Injury” 
Exception to the Discharge in Bankruptcy, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 199–202 (2014) 
(arguing the statutory term “willful” should be interpreted to require voluntary and 
affirmative conduct so that “a mere failure to perform a contract is not conduct that is 
sufficiently culpable to warrant nondischargeability”); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, With 
Malice Toward One?—Defining Nondischargeability of Debts for Willful and Malicious 
Injury Under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 151, 
183–84 (2016) (concluding that § 523(a)(6) should permit nondischargeability of intentional 
breaches of contract that lack business justification “where the standard of intent is met and 
no justification exists for the breach (e.g., the breach is not efficient by commercial law 
standards)”).
92 Matthew Harte, A Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code’s Exception to Discharge 
for Debts Arising from Wrongful Conduct, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 113, 136 (2009) 
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author recommends narrowing the intentional tort requirement to only include 
intentional torts that are eligible for punitive damages under state law.93 This 
approach has at least two weaknesses. First, state tort law varies significantly, 
both in the type of intentional torts and the standards for punitive damages. For 
example, at least five states prohibit punitive damages or allow them only under 
limited statutory grounds against particular defendants.94 Two other states treat 
punitive damages as being only compensatory in nature.95 Defining malicious 
to require torts eligible for punitive damages would prevent a uniform national 
standard for the exception to discharge. Secondly, the determination of the scope 
of the bankruptcy discharge, which is often delineated by the exceptions to 
discharge, is a matter of federal law and should not be given to the states.96
                                                                                                                     
(“The Ninth Circuit rule requiring tortious conduct for a debt to be nondischargeable should 
be universally adopted . . . .”). But cf. Andrea R. Blake, Debts Nondischargeable for “Willful 
and Malicious Injury”: Applicability of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6) in a Commercial 
Setting, 104 COM. L.J. 64, 96 (1999) (“[T]o impose a per se rule that § 523(a)(6) applies only 
to [traditional intentional torts] would not accord with the Court’s longstanding policy of 
limiting the bankruptcy fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”); Michael D. 
Martinez, Where There’s a “Will,” There Should Be a Way: Why In re Salvino Unjustifiably 
Restricts the Application of § 523(a)(6) to Exclude Willful and Malicious Breaches of 
Contract, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 467 (2009) (stating a bankruptcy court “was wrong 
when it concluded that tortious conduct is an essential element of a willful and malicious 
injury under § 523(a)(6)” (footnote omitted)).
93 Bryan Hoynak, Filling in the Blank: Defining Breaches of Contract Excepted from 
Discharge as Willful and Malicious Injuries to Property Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 693, 728–30 (2010) (arguing not only that the debtor’s conduct must 
be an intentional tort as defined by state law, but that it also must be one that is eligible for 
punitive damages under state law).
94 McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385–86 (La. 1932) (“There is no authority 
in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive damages in any case, unless it be for some 
particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the imposition of some such 
penalty.”); City of Lowell v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943) 
(“In this Commonwealth exemplary damages are not allowed unless authorized by statute.”); 
Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) (“It has been a fundamental rule of law 
in this state that punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages will not be allowed, and that the 
measure of recovery in all civil cases is compensation for the injury sustained.”); Stewart v. 
Bader, 907 A.2d 931, 943 (N.H. 2006) (“Punitive damages are not allowed in New 
Hampshire . . . unless authorized by statute.” (citations omitted)); Broughton Lumber Co. v. 
BNSF Ry. Co., 278 P.3d 173, 183 n.14 (Wash. 2012) (“Washington prohibits the recovery 
of punitive damages as a violation of public policy unless expressly authorized by statute.”).
95 Anastasia v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 59 A.3d 207, 210 n.2 (Conn. 2013) (“[P]unitive 
damages ‘serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are . . . limited 
to the plaintiff’s litigation expenses less taxable costs . . . .’” (quoting Matthiessen v. Vanech, 
836 A.2d 394, 395 n.5 (Conn. 2003))); Hayes-Albion v. Kuberski, 364 N.W.2d 609, 617 
(Mich. 1984) (“[T]he purpose of exemplary damages in Michigan has not been to punish the 
defendant, but to render the plaintiff whole.”).
96 In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the § 523(a)(4) 
exception to discharge for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity and explaining 
that “[i]f . . . a fiduciary is anyone whom a state calls a fiduciary . . . states will have it in 
their power to deny a fresh start to their debtors by declaring all contractual relations 
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Other commentators argue for uniform adoption of the Tinker definition of 
malicious but have not addressed what a wrongful act is.97 This 
recommendation is not helpful because it provides no guidance on how 
wrongful an act must be in order to make it malicious. This Article seeks to 
provide that guidance.
III. ANALYSIS OF WHAT MALICE SHOULD REQUIRE UNDER BANKRUPTCY 
LAW
Section 523(a)(6) requires a “willful and malicious injury.”98 The term 
“injury” has been construed to include physical harm,99 emotional harm,100
property damage,101 and the “invasion of the legal rights of another.”102 The 
term “willful” has been construed to require “a deliberate or intentional injury, 
not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”103 The Tinker
definition of malicious requires “a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just 
cause or excuse.”104
                                                                                                                     
fiduciary”); see also Jonathon S. Byington, Fiduciary Capacity and the Bankruptcy 
Discharge, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2016) (explaining that although state law 
is often essential to the analysis, the meaning of words in the Bankruptcy Code is a question 
of federal law and that “[o]ne reason for this different treatment is that bankruptcy policies 
differ from those under state law”).
97 Shawn M. Blatt, Section 523(a)(6): Willful and Malicious Exception from 
Discharge: The “Implied Malice” Standard, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 155, 182 (1990) (“The 
majority approach, applying an implied malice standard, offers the best interpretation of the 
meaning of willful and malicious.”); Karen N. Fischer, The Exception to Discharge for 
Willful and Malicious Injury: The Proper Standard for Malice, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 259 
(1990) (“The implied malice formulation seems to be the more equitable standard.”).
98 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
99 Lovato v. Irvin (In re Irvin), 31 B.R. 251, 253 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (finding an 
injury where debtor stabbed another in the back and across the chest with a steak knife).
100 Magana v. Moore Dev. Corp. (In re Moore), 1 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979) 
(finding it was not necessary that there be physical abuse and that “the humiliation felt by a 
minority person refused service because of their race, or who is forced from rental housing 
by harassment, may well be more painful to the recipient and longer lasting than the effect 
of a physical beating”); Berman v. Berman (In re Berman), 26 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1982).
101 Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso), 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]njury to property 
includes the conversion of property subject to a creditor’s security interest.”); Hardwick v. 
Petsch (In re Petsch), 82 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (finding a security interest 
is property for purposes of § 523(a)(6)).
102 Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 
U.S. 57 (1998); Horizon Fin. Bank v. Borstad (In re Borstad), 550 B.R. 803, 839 (Bankr. D. 
N.D. 2016) (citing Geiger, 113 F.3d at 852).
103 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 63 (“Tinker . . . placed criminal conversation solidly within 
the traditional intentional tort category, and we so confine its holding.”).
104 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 
107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
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Circuit courts have struggled to consistently apply the Tinker definition of 
malicious. As one recently observed, “in the course of our research we have 
discovered to our surprise that courts are all over the lot . . . .”105 Most circuit 
courts do not require personal hatred, spite, or ill-will.106 Many allow malice to 
be constructive or implied based on the conduct of the debtor in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances.107 But the circuit courts differ in how they treat 
the intent and wrongfulness components of the Tinker definition of malicious. 
This Part explores each aspect of the Tinker definition: intent, a wrongful act, 
and attribution.
                                                                                                                     
105 Jendusa-Nicolai v. Larsen, 677 F.3d 320, 322 (7th Cir. 2012).
106 Kane v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. (In re Kane), 755 F.3d 1285, 1294 
(11th Cir. 2014) (“‘Malicious’ means wrongful and without just cause or excessive even in 
the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.” (quoting Maxfield v. Jennings (In re
Jennings), 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012)); Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. 
Levasseur (In re Levasseur), 737 F.3d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 2013) (“An injury is malicious ‘if 
it was wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, 
spite or ill-will.’” (quoting Printy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 110 F.3d 853, 859 (1st Cir. 
1997))); Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The injury caused by the 
debtor must also be malicious, meaning ‘wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in 
the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will.’” (quoting Navistar Fin. Corp. v. Stelluti (In 
re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1996)); Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 
1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A ‘malicious’ injury involves ‘(1) a wrongful act, (2) done 
intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or 
excuse.’” (quoting Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1997)));
Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1994) (abrogated on other grounds) 
(stating a malicious injury is one that “was wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even 
in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will” (quoting Laganella v. Braen (In re Braen), 
900 F.2d 621, 626 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990))). Contra Raspanti v. Keaty (In re Keaty), 397 F.3d 
264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005) (aggregating “willful and malicious” into a unitary concept); Miller 
v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603–06 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting malicious 
as meaning without just cause or excuse and instead defining malicious to mean an act done 
with the actual intent to cause injury).
107 In re Kane, 1285 F.3d at 1295 (finding conduct wrongful based on the circumstances, 
including testimony that “even in the moment, the secrecy of the settlement did not ‘feel 
right’” and that the wrongful acts were “excessive”); Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev. 
(In re Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Transamerica Commercial Fin. 
Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1991)); In re Stelluti, 94 F.3d 
at 88 (“Malice may be constructive or implied.” (citing In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1164 
(11th Cir. 1995))); First Nat’l Bank of Md. v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 66 F.3d 664, 668 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (“Implied malice . . . may be shown by the acts and conduct of the debtor in the 
context of [the] surrounding circumstances.” (quoting Hagan v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 
62 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1995))); Lee v. Ikner (In re Ikner), 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir. 
1989) (“Constructive or implied malice can be found if the nature of the act itself implies a 
sufficient degree of malice.” (citing United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 B.R. 766, 769 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983))).
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A. Intent Should Not Be an Element of “Malicious” Under § 523(a)(6)
This section reviews non-bankruptcy law to illustrate that intent is 
commonly associated with malice. It then turns to bankruptcy law and evaluates 
the overlap of the “done intentionally”108 element of malicious with the statutory 
term “willful” in § 523(a)(6).109 The meaning of “willful” is explored as well as 
the circuit court struggle to construe the “done intentionally” element of malice 
given the intent-based meaning of the term “willful.” Although non-bankruptcy 
law typically utilizes malice as a label for some type of intent, this section 
recommends § 523(a)(6)’s statutory term “malicious” be construed to not 
require any intent because the statutory term “willful” already encompasses 
intent.
1. Malice Usually Requires Intent Under Non-Bankruptcy Law
This section traverses common-law murder, punitive damages, and 
defamation to show that under non-bankruptcy law, malice typically requires 
some type of intent.
a. Malice and Common-Law Murder
Criminal law utilizes malice as a label for various mental states that are 
related to the crime of murder. Under common law, murder is the unlawful 
killing of another with malice aforethought.110 The phrase “malice 
aforethought” has been called a “term of art,”111 “juridical shorthand,”112 an 
“arbitrary symbol,”113 and a “myster[y].”114 It encompasses several states of 
                                                                                                                     
108 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 485–86 (quoting Bromage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1054, 4 Barn. & 
Cress. at 255).
109 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
110 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210.2 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1980); LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 765; TORCIA, supra note 1, at § 139.
111 Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 707 (1937) (“The most striking phase of the development of the English 
law was the reduction of ‘malice aforethought’ to a term of art signifying neither ‘malice’ 
nor ‘forethought’ in the popular sense.”).
112 Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 570 
(1934) (“[‘Malice aforethought’] is rather a bit of juridical shorthand than an explanatory 
expression. It is not a key which unlocks mysteries, but a label to be attached after the secret 
is solved. It has no magical powers. It is not a rule of thumb which can dispense with a rigid 
scrutiny of the facts of each particular case. It is, however, a convenient symbol.”).
113 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210.2 cmt. 1 (“Whatever the 
original meaning of [the phrase malice aforethought], it became over time an ‘arbitrary 
symbol’ used by judges to signify any of a number of mental states deemed sufficient to 
support liability for murder.”).
114 Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Art of Malice, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 435 (2008) (“One 
of the serious wrongs in our system is found in the way we instruct juries in a criminal 
homicide case about the crucial, but mysterious, concept of malice.”).
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mind any one of which is sufficient for murder.115 The states of mind include: 
“(1) intent to kill; (2) intent to cause great bodily harm; (3) intent to do an act 
knowing that it will probably cause death or great bodily harm; [and (4)] intent 
to commit a felony.”116 Notably, the drafters of the Model Penal Code decided 
not to use the phrase “malice aforethought” in the Model Penal Code’s
definition of murder.117 Instead, the Model Penal Code employs categories of 
mental states or culpability such as purposely, knowingly, and recklessly.118
Some commentators suggest the phrase malice aforethought preceded the year 
1340.119 Despite its aged origin, numerous states still utilize malice in their 
definition of murder.120
b. Malice and Punitive Damages
Malice is often associated with punitive damages under tort law. In this 
context, malice commonly refers to some type of intent or state of mind, such 
as deliberate conduct that is outrageous or a disregard for the rights of 
another.121 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “mere inadvertence, 
mistake, errors of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence”
                                                                                                                     
115 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210.2 cmt. 1 (explaining that the 
phrase malice aforethought is “used by judges to signify any of a number of mental states 
deemed sufficient to support liability for murder”); Perkins, supra note 112, at 568–69 
(claiming malice aforethought should be defined as “an unjustifiable, inexcusable and 
unmitigated man-endangering-state-of-mind”).
116 TORCIA, supra note 1, at § 139; accord MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,
Part II § 210.2 cmt. 1.
117 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210.
118 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 210 Intro. Note (“Murder is defined in 
Section 210.2 to include cases where a criminal homicide is committed purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life. . . . [T]hese concepts provide a more satisfactory means of stating the 
culpability required for murder than did the older language of ‘malice aforethought’ and its 
derivatives.”).
119 Comment, Malice Aforethought, 33 YALE L.J. 528, 530–31 (1923–1924) (observing 
that murder came to mean homicide with malice aforethought after 1340, but that in seeking 
to find the origin of our modern definition of murder, the time period before 1340 must be 
considered); Perkins, supra note 112, at 544.
120 Russ, supra note 1, at 962.
121 Dorsey D. Ellis Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1982) (“[M]alice [is] a state of mind; the desire to harm another that 
accompanies and provides a reason for an intentional act.”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (describing the type of conduct justifying punitive 
damages as “conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others”). See generally 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE 
M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 21:23 (2d ed. 2016) (surveying 
similar state definitions).
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and mere “breach of contract” are not enough for punitive damages.122 As one 
treatise observes, “[t]here must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such 
as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, 
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the 
conduct may be called wilful or wanton.”123
Approximately forty states include malice as a basis to award punitive 
damages.124 Even though they define malice differently, they largely focus on 
                                                                                                                     
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 
2, at 9 (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive 
damages.”).
123 KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 9–10.
124 ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (LexisNexis 2014); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (2016); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.01(2) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206(1) (2005); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2017); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1604(1) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.184(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing for punitive damages for malice, whose 
definition in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(1)(c) was held in violation of the jural rights 
doctrine and unconstitutional by Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 269 (Ky. 1998)); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.205(10) (West 2008); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) 
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(a) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1827 (LexisNexis 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(a) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11(1) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 9.1(D) (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2017); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
28-10(b)(1) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-2
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(1) (2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.003(a) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.043(3) (West 2016); Destefano v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 121 A.3d 
59, 66 (D.C. 2015) (affording punitive damages to a plaintiff who proves “that the 
[defendant] ‘acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or with 
intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff’” (quoting District of 
Columbia v. Bamidele, 103 A.3d 516, 522 (D.C. 2014))); Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki 
Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10, 37 (Haw. 1992) (stating plaintiff must prove “that the 
defendant has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of 
mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations” (quoting Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989))); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978) 
(“[P]unitive . . . damages may be awarded [for acts] committed with fraud, actual malice, 
deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross 
negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.” (citing Consol. Coal of 
St. Louis v. Haenni, 35 N.E. 162, 165 (Ill. 1893))); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 
362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 1977) (“Punitive damages may be awarded . . . ‘whenever the 
elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression mingle in the controversy.’” 
(quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976))); Oliver v. 
Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 (Me. 1983) (stating punitive damages may be awarded where 
“conduct was accompanied by aggravating circumstances; i.e., whether it was intentional, 
wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent” (first citing McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 
A.2d 1028, 1031 & n.3 (Me. 1982); and then citing Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 
A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979))); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (Md. 1992) 
(permitting punitive damages to a plaintiff who shows “that the defendant’s conduct was 
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intent. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that malice is “(1) 
that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill 
will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety 
of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”125 In 
California, malice is statutorily defined as “conduct which is intended by the 
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried 
on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety 
of others.”126 The Maine Supreme Court has found that “malice exists where the 
defendant’s tortious conduct is motivated by ill will toward the plaintiff . . . [or] 
where deliberate conduct by the defendant, although motivated by something 
other than ill will toward any particular party, is so outrageous that malice 
toward a person injured as a result of that conduct can be implied.”127
c. Malice and Defamation
In the context of the tort of defamation, malice means a knowing or reckless 
falsehood. Defamation is the publication of a statement that “tends . . . to harm 
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or 
                                                                                                                     
characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, i.e., ‘actual malice’”); Smith 
v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 308, 319 (Mich. 1969) (stating punitive damages are awarded “where 
there is malice, or willful or wanton misconduct” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Scripps v. 
Reilly, 38 Mich. 10, 23 (Mich. 1878))); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Pyramid 
Champlain Co., 193 A.D.2d 928, 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d 1993) (requiring plaintiff to allege 
facts indicating that the defendant acted in a “wanton, willful or malicious manner” (quoting 
RKB Enters., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 182 A.D.2d 971, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d 1992))); Post 
& Beam Equities Grp., LLC v. Sunne Village Dev. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 124 A.3d 454, 469 
(Vt. 2015) (“Punitive damages are permitted . . . when defendant’s acts are . . . ’intentional 
and deliberate’ and conducted with ‘actual malice’—that is, ‘bad spirit and wrong 
intention’ . . . .” (quoting Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086, 1095 (Vt. 1999)));
Condo. Servs., Inc. v. First Owners’ Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 709 S.E.2d 
163, 174 (Va. 2011) (“Punitive . . . damages are allowable only where there is misconduct 
or actual malice, or such recklessness or negligence as to evince a conscious disregard of the 
rights of others.” (first quoting Giant of Va., Inc. v. Pigg, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Va. 1967); 
and then citing Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 699 (Va. 2007))); Belcher 
v. Terry, 420 S.E.2d 909, 914–15 (W. Va. 1992) (“[W]here there is an intentional wrong, or 
where there are circumstances which warrant an inference of malice, willfulness, or wanton 
disregard of the rights of others, punitive damages may be awarded.” (quoting Addair v. 
Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 743 (W. Va. 1973))); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1013 
(Wyo. 1975) (stating punitive damages require “the act of the defendant [be] committed 
maliciously, willfully or wantonly” (citing Wilson v. Hall, 244 P. 1002, 1003 (Wyo. 1926))).
125 Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987).
126 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West 2016).
127 Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985) (citations omitted) (“We 
emphasize that for the purpose of assessing punitive damages, such ‘implied’ or ‘legal’ 
malice will not be established by the defendant’s mere reckless disregard of the 
circumstances.”).
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to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”128 A plaintiff must 
prove (1) an unprivileged communication to a third party (2) of a false and 
defamatory statement, (3) fault, and (4) damages.129 In New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that defamation cases involving a public 
official also require the statement be made “with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”130 A tort treatise explains:
Actual malice has become a term of art to provide a convenient shorthand for 
the New York Times standard of liability. It is quite different from the common 
law standard of “malice” generally required under state tort law to support an 
award of punitive damages. While the common law standard focuses on the 
defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff, actual malice concentrates on the 
defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material published.131
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, malice is used under non-
bankruptcy law as an intent-based concept, with the required type of intent 
varying depending on the area of law.
2. Intent Is the Entire Characteristic of “Willful” Under § 523(a)(6)
Even though non-bankruptcy law typically defines malice to require some 
type of intent, the term “malicious” in § 523(a)(6) should not do so because 
intent is already a necessary element of the statutory term “willful.”
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts for “willful and malicious injury 
by the debtor.”132 The Tinker Court held that for bankruptcy purposes, malice 
requires a wrongful act that is “done intentionally.”133 This “done intentionally”
                                                                                                                     
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 2, at 773 (“Defamation is . . . that which tends to injure ‘reputation’ in the 
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff 
is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.” 
(internal citation omitted)); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 936 (2d ed. 2016) 
(“Defamation law, executed through the rules of libel and slander, aims at protecting 
reputation and good name against false and derogatory communications.”).
129 4 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION,
§ 36:1 (2d ed. 2003).
130 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring) (extending the requirement to 
“public figures”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 989 (comparing “actual malice” with 
knowing or reckless falsehood).
131 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 129, at § 36:40. Another treatise suggests “it may 
facilitate analysis to avoid the actual malice terminology and specify knowing or reckless 
falsehood instead.” DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 989.
132 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
133 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 
107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
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requirement is confusing because it overlaps the term “willful” in § 523(a)(6).134
This Part examines the meaning of willful in § 523(a)(6), looks at how the 
circuit courts have split on the way they treat intent as an element of malice, and 
then turns to the interplay between the statutory terms “willful” and “malicious.”
a. The Statutory Term “Willful” Is Intent-Based and Requires a 
Deliberate or Intentional Injury
The term “willful” in § 523(a)(6) is intent-based. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this term on two occasions.135 In 1904, the Tinker Court briefly noted 
that “willful” requires an act that is “intentional and voluntary.”136 The 
remainder of the Tinker decision focused on the term malicious.137 In 1998, the 
Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger changed the willful standard to require 
“a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that 
leads to injury.”138
Kawaauhau involved a medical malpractice case where the debtor was a 
doctor.139 The debtor provided treatment to a patient for a foot injury and 
admitted her to the hospital to attend to the risk of infection.140 The debtor 
decided not to transfer the patient to an infectious disease specialist and 
discontinued all antibiotics because he believed the infection had subsided.141
The patient’s condition deteriorated and eventually her right leg was amputated 
below the knee.142 The patient was awarded a money judgment against the 
debtor for malpractice and the debtor filed bankruptcy.143 The patient argued the 
malpractice award was debt for a willful and malicious injury because the debtor 
“intentionally rendered inadequate medical care . . . that necessarily led to [the 
patient’s] injury.”144
The Kawaauhau Court explained that “[t]he word ‘willful’ in (a)(6) 
modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate 
or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to 
injury.”145 The Kawaauhau Court continued: “the (a)(6) formulation triggers in 
                                                                                                                     
134 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
135 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); Tinker, 193 U.S. 473.
136 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 485 (interpreting § 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 stating 
“[t]he act is willful, of course, in the sense that it is intentional and voluntary, and we think 
that it is also malicious within the meaning of the statute”). 
137 See supra Part II.B.1.
138 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61; see also id. at 63 (“Tinker . . . placed criminal 
conversation solidly within the traditional intentional tort category, and we so confine its 
holding.”).




143 Id. at 59–60.
144 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61.
145 Id.
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the lawyer’s mind the category ‘intentional torts,’ as distinguished from 
negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor 
intend ‘the consequences of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’”146 The Court 
clarified that willful does not include “situations in which an act is intentional, 
but injury is unintended, i.e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the 
debtor.”147 Consequently, it held that “debts arising from recklessly or 
negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6).”148
b. The Circuit Courts Have Split on the Way They Treat the “Done 
Intentionally” Element of Malicious
The circuit courts have split on the way they treat the “done intentionally”
element of the Tinker definition of malicious.149 Some circuits do not define 
malicious to require any type of intent. The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits 
have dropped the “done intentionally” element from the Tinker definition of 
malicious.150
                                                                                                                     
146 Id. at 61–62 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) § 8A, cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1965)).
147 Id. at 62.
148 Id. at 64; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978) (“Paragraph (5) provides that 
debts for willful and malicious . . . injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of 
another entity are nondischargeable. Under this paragraph ‘willful’ means deliberate or 
intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell held that a less strict standard is intended, 
and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ 
standard, they are overruled.” (citation omitted)). This report was speaking only of the willful 
element of § 523(a)(6), not the malicious element. See Tabb, supra note 45, at 77 (“On its 
face, the statement obviously refers only to the ‘willful’ component of the discharge 
exception. Nothing is said about ‘malice,’ and it is thus difficult to see how Tinker v. 
Colwell’s implied malice formulation could be interpreted as being overruled.” (internal 
citations omitted)).
149 See generally Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. 
Prosser (1825), 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255) (“[Malice] in its legal 
sense . . . means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.”). It 
appears that some of the circuit courts have gone the way that they have gone because they 
were bound by their own pre-Kawaauhau circuit decisions. See, e.g., Kane v. Stewart 
Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A. (In re Kane), 755 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Maxfield v. Jennings (In re Jennings), 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012)); Old Republic 
Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Levasseur (In re Levasseur), 737 F.3d 814, 819 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing 
Printy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 110 F.3d 853, 859–60 (1st Cir. 1997))); Ball v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69–70 (2nd Cir. 2006) (citing Navistar Fin. Corp. v. Stelluti (In 
re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1996)).
150 Kane, 755 F.3d at 1294 (“‘Malicious’ means wrongful and without just cause or 
excessive even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will. To establish malice, a 
showing of specific intent to harm another is not necessary.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted in original) (quoting Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334)); Levasseur, 737 F.3d at 
818 (“An injury is malicious ‘if it was wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in 
the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.’” (quoting Printy, 110 F.3d at 859)); Ball,
451 F.3d at 69 (stating a malicious injury must be “wrongful and without just cause or 
2018] DEBTOR MALICE 1047
The Seventh Circuit requires a level of intent that is similar to the Model 
Penal Code’s culpability of acting “recklessly.”151 It defines malicious to require 
the debtor to have acted “in conscious disregard of [his or her] duties or without 
just cause or excuse; it does not require ill-will or specific intent to do harm.”152
The Eighth Circuit requires a level of intent that is akin to the Model Penal 
Code’s culpability of acting “knowingly.”153 It held that malice “requires more 
than recklessness or reckless disregard”154 and necessitates conduct “targeted at 
the creditor . . . at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain 
to cause . . . harm.”155 The Fourth Circuit has not issued a published opinion on 
the topic after Kawaauhau but appears to define malice to require “[a]n act that 
is done deliberately and intentionally in knowing disregard of the rights of 
another . . . .”156
Other circuits define malicious to require a level of intent that is similar to 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s definition of “intent.”157 The Tenth Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will” (quoting Stelluti, 94 F.3d 
84, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1996))).
151 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) 
(“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering 
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person 
would observe in the actor’s situation.”).
152 First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting In re 
Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1994)).
153 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (“A person acts 
knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . if the element involves 
a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause 
such a result.”).
154 Roussel v. Clear Sky Props., LLC, 829 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 2016).
155 Sells v. Porter (In re Porter), 539 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Siemer v. 
Nangle (In re Nangle), 274 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 2001)); see also Roussel, 829 F.3d at 
1047 (permitting an inference of malice for a similar standard of culpability); Barclays 
Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985) (“When 
transfers in breach of security agreements are in issue, we believe nondischargeability turns 
on whether the conduct is (1) headstrong and knowing (‘willful’) and, (2) targeted at the 
creditor (‘malicious’), at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to 
cause financial harm.”).
156 Hagan v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 62 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Rountrey v. Lee (In re Lee), 90 B.R. 202, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)); accord Harrell v. 
Merch.’s Express Money Order Co. (In re Harrell), No. 98-1728, 1999 WL 150278, at *2 
(4th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999) (holding willful means “deliberate or intentional” and malice 
requires “a debtor’s injurious act be done deliberately and intentionally in knowing disregard 
of the rights of another”); see also First Nat’l Bank of Md. v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 66 F.3d 
664, 667 (4th Cir. 1995); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn (In re Vaughn), 779 
F.2d 1003, 1010 (4th Cir. 1985).
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) 
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defines malicious to require “the debtor either intend the resulting injury or 
intentionally take action that is substantially certain to cause the injury.”158 After 
Kawaauhau, the Sixth Circuit articulated a new standard that does not separate 
the statutory terms willful and malicious. It held that “unless ‘the actor desires 
to cause consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it,’ he has not committed a ‘willful and 
malicious injury’ . . . .”159
Over the course of several decisions, the Fifth Circuit abandoned the Tinker
definition of malicious.160 It eventually aggregated the statutory terms willful 
and malicious into a unitary concept requiring “‘either an objective substantial 
certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm’ on the part of the 
debtor.”161 The Third Circuit has not given separate meaning to the terms 
“willful” and “malicious” but has held that an injury is willful and malicious 
“only if the actor purposefully inflicted the injury or acted with substantial 
certainty that injury would result.”162 The Ninth Circuit treats the statutory terms 
willful and malicious as separate.163 It has defined malicious to require a 
                                                                                                                     
the person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts 
knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (defining intent “to denote that the 
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it”).
158 Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore), 357 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hope 
v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 1995)).
159 Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A); accord Kennedy v. Mustaine (In re 
Kennedy), 249 F.3d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
160 Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 605 (5th Cir. 1998)) 
(mischaracterizing the holding of Vickers v. Home Indem. Co. (In re Vickers), 546 F.2d 
1149, 1150–51 (5th Cir. 1977), defining malicious to mean without just cause or excuse, and 
also incorrectly stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kawaauhau displaced the just 
cause or excuse standard of malice); Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney), 97 F.3d 800, 802 
(5th Cir. 1996) (“[F]or willfulness and malice to prevent discharge under § 523(a)(6), the 
debtor must have intended the actual injury that resulted.”); Seven Elves, Inc. v Eskenazi, 
704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1983) (mischaracterizing the holding of Petty v. Dardar (In re 
Dardar), 620 F.2d 39, 40–41 (5th Cir. 1980) and defining malicious to mean the absence of 
just cause or excuse).
161 Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 
509 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller, 156 F.3d at 606); see also Raspanti v. Keaty (In re 
Keaty), 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005) (aggregating “willful and malicious” into a unitary 
concept).
162 Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Link v. 
Mauz (In re Mauz), 672 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2017); McQueen v. Macri (In re Macri), 
642 F. App’x 128, 129 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Granoff, 250 F. App’x 494, 495 (3d Cir. 2007).
163 Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Although there may be some overlap between the test for ‘willfulness’ and the test for 
‘malice,’ the overlap does not mean that the Bankruptcy Court can ignore entirely the malice 
inquiry. We require a separate analysis for each of the ‘willful’ and ‘malicious’ prongs.” 
(citations omitted)).
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wrongful act that is “done intentionally”164 and then analyzed whether the 
debtor knew an injury was substantially certain to occur.165
c. Intent Should Not Be an Element of “Malicious” Under § 523(a)(6) 
Because It Is Already Encompassed by the Statutory Term “Willful”
The circuit court split on whether intent should be a required part of 
malicious shows the need for guidance. The overlap between the term “willful”
in § 523(a)(6) and the “done intentionally” element of malicious from Tinker
has caused confusion in the circuit courts. The Kawaauhau Court interpreted 
willful to require a “deliberate or intentional injury.”166 The Tinker definition of 
malicious requires a wrongful act that is “done intentionally.”167 As the 
Kawaauhau Court pointed out, there is a meaningful difference between an 
intentional act that leads to injury and a “deliberate or intentional injury.”168 The 
deliberate or intentional injury requirement of “willful” invariably subsumes the 
intentional act requirement of “malicious.” In other words, the intent required 
by the Kawaauhau Court’s 1998 interpretation of willful will always encompass 
the intent needed by the Tinker Court’s 1904 definition of malicious.
Accordingly, the “done intentionally” element of malicious should be 
abandoned because it no longer serves any function due to it being subsumed 
by the intentional injury element of willful. This approach reconciles the overlap 
on intent created by the Tinker Court’s definition of malicious with the later-
decided definition of willful in Kawaauhau. It also provides an instructive 
construct for evaluating what malicious should mean. The Kawaauhau Court’s
interpretation clarified that § 523(a)(6) is relying upon the term “willful” to fully 
embody intent, not malicious.
                                                                                                                     
164 Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding a
malicious injury requires “(1) a wrongful act, (2) done intentionally, (3) which necessarily 
causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or excuse”).
165 Id. (holding state court findings were sufficient to show that the injury inflicted was 
malicious where “Jercich knew he owed Petralia the wages and that injury to Petralia was 
substantially certain to occur if the wages were not paid”); see also Ormsby v. First Am. 
Title Co. of Nev. (In re Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding conduct met 
the malicious prong because “Ormsby knew that FATCO’s injury was substantially certain 
to occur as a result of his conduct”).
166 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
167 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 
107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
168 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61.
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B. Determining a Wrongful Act That Is Malicious
Section 523(a)(6) requires a “willful and malicious injury.”169 The Tinker 
Court’s definition of malicious requires “a wrongful act.”170 Other than 
situations involving attribution (such as self-defense), intentionally injuring 
another is inherently a wrongful act. This suggests that the wrongful act element 
of malicious is modifying the statutory term “injury” in a way that makes it 
distinct from acts that are wrongful simply because the debtor intentionally 
caused an injury. In other words, there is a difference between a mere willful 
injury and the required willful and malicious injury. This section reviews some 
of the ways criminal and tort law identify wrongful acts and concludes that those 
methods will not work under § 523(a)(6)’s standard. It then evaluates how to 
determine wrongfulness that constitutes a malicious injury under bankruptcy 
law.
1. Methods Used by Criminal and Tort Law to Identify Wrongful Acts
One challenging aspect of the “willful and malicious injury” standard under 
§ 523(a)(6) is that it is cause of action neutral, meaning it is not limited to 
identified criminal offenses or specific tort claims. Considering how criminal 
law and tort law identify offenses and claims is instructive.
Criminal law separates wrong from not wrong by “declar[ing] what conduct 
is criminal and prescrib[ing] the punishment to be imposed for such conduct.”171
Crimes are defined by identified acts or omissions along with specified mental 
states.172 For example, a person is guilty of false imprisonment if they 
“knowingly restrain[] another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with 
[the other’s] liberty.”173 The mental state of “knowingly” performs a function 
that is similar to the “willful” requirement of § 523(a)(6). The phrase “restrains 
another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty” describes 
what specific conduct and result are required for the crime. The Tinker Court’s
definition of malicious, which requires a “wrongful act,” is much broader than 
a single instance of specifically identified conduct. As presently defined by the 
Tinker Court, this breadth limits the ability of the term to perform its sorting 
function.
                                                                                                                     
169 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
170 Tinker, 193 U.S. at 486 (1904) (quoting Bromage, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1054, 4 Barn. & 
Cress. at 255).
171 LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 8.
172 Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 1.13(9) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985) (defining the term “element of an offense” to mean specified conduct, attendant 
circumstances or a result of conduct). Of course, strict liability crimes do not have a required 
mental state. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 2.05(1)(b).
173 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) 
(defining false imprisonment).
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Tort law provides limited assistance in modeling how to identify wrongful 
acts that are malicious. “[T]ortious conduct is twisted conduct, conduct that 
departs from the existing norm” and “torts are traditionally associated with 
wrongdoing in some moral sense.”174 For many torts, the primary basis of 
liability is the fault or blameworthiness of the tortfeasor.175 As one treatise 
observes: “The issue of fault . . . dominates most of tort law. Although fault may 
be defined quite differently according to the factual setting and relationships of 
the parties, courts are deeply involved with defining fault in a large proportion 
of all tort cases.”176 Tort law uses three different principles to determine fault: 
intent, recklessness, and negligence.177 Section 523(a)(6)’s willful requirement 
is intent-based and performs a function that is similar to torts based on intent178
                                                                                                                     
174 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 4 (“The term ‘tort’ is derived from Latin roots 
meaning ‘twisted.’”); see id. at 3 (“A tort is conduct that constitutes a legal wrong and causes 
harm for which courts will impose civility liability.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 
(“Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the court 
will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages . . . .”); Tort, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a tort as “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of 
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu[ally] in the form of damages; a breach of 
a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another”).
175 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 4–5 (“[F]ault remains the basis of tort liability and 
a marker of its limits in the overwhelming number of cases.”). But see id. at 5 (“In a few 
instances tort law imposes strict liability. Strict liability is liability without proof of 
fault . . . [where] liability may be imposed as a matter of legal policy irrespective of the 
defendant’s fault.”). 
176 Id. at 12. The fault principle has been explained in KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 
608 as follows:
Unless other interests served outweigh intended harms and are treated as justification, 
conduct causing intended harms is blameworthy. When blameworthy conduct causes 
harms to others, the blameworthy actor ought, in general, to compensate for those 
harms. Similarly, unintended harms are ordinarily compensable if caused by conduct 
that involves undue risks—risks that, along with other costs, outweigh the usefulness 
of the conduct causing the harms. Conduct of this kind is socially undesirable and 
deserves to be classified as blameworthy.
(footnotes omitted).
177 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§ 1–3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). The terminology employed to administer these principles 
“possesses great elasticity.” Ellis, supra note 121, at 34 (“One source of tort law’s enduring 
vitality and resilience is the use of terminology possessing great elasticity. Ineffably vague 
terms such as negligence, duty, and the reasonable person, serve to minimize or at least to 
mask the inevitable tension between the often conflicting objectives the law seeks to 
further.”). 
178 “A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if (a) the person acts with 
the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the 
consequence is substantially certain to result.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1; see also id. § 1 cmt. c (“[K]nowledge that harm 
is substantially certain to result is sufficient to show that the harm is intentional even in the 
absence of a purpose to bring about that harm. Of course, a mere showing that harm is 
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and recklessness.179 Negligence is not directly analogous to § 523(a)(6) because 
it is impossible to have a negligent injury that is also willful.180 But it is 
instructive to consider the allocation of fault based on negligence principles as 
a comparative methodology for determining a wrongful act that is malicious.
A person is negligent if they do not use reasonable care under the 
circumstances.181 In a negligence case, the tortfeasor does not desire to cause 
injury, and harm is a possibility but not a certainty.182 Negligence involves an 
objective perspective on risk “as it would be perceived by a reasonable 
person.”183 Negligence principles determine fault by comparing the conduct in 
question to the conduct of a reasonable person.184 This comparison method is 
helpful because, like § 523(a)(6), it is not tethered to specifically enumerated 
conduct.185 The measure of deviation in negligence is embodied in the concept 
of breach—whether the defendant violated the appropriate standard of 
conduct.186 Therefore, comparison is a useful method to identify wrongful 
conduct.
                                                                                                                     
substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct is not sufficient to prove intent; it must 
also be shown that the actor is aware of this.”).
179 Recklessness requires conduct where: “(a) the person knows of the risk of harm 
created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s 
situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that 
are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to adopt 
the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference to the risk.” Id. § 2 and cmt. a 
(“This Section, along with other materials in the three current Restatement Third projects, 
supersedes coverage of recklessness in Chapter 19 of the Restatement Second of Torts.”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
180 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 200 (“Because the emphasis in negligence cases 
is on unreasonably risky conduct, a bad state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
show negligence. . . . The legal concept of negligence as unduly risky conduct distinct from 
state of mind reflects the law’s strong commitment to an objective standard of behavior.”).
181 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 (stating the primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks 
reasonable care are “the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, 
the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm”); see DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 187.
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 1 cmt. d.
183 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 58.
184 KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 32, at 173.
185 Id. at 173–74 (“The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard 
of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix 
definite rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. The utmost that can be done is 
to devise something in the nature of a formula, the application of which in each particular 
case must be left to the jury, or to the court. . . . The courts have dealt with this very difficult 
problem by creating a fictitious person, who never has existed on land or sea: the ‘reasonable
man of ordinary prudence.’”).
186 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 128, at 206.
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2. A Malicious Injury Under Bankruptcy Law Should Require an 
Extraordinarily Wrongful Act in Order to Perform Its Sorting Function
Defining malicious to require a mere “wrongful act” prevents the term from 
performing its sorting function. Under a generic definition, an act is wrongful if 
it is “a violation of a valid norm prohibiting or requiring specific conduct.”187
An act can also be described as wrongful if it harms the legitimate interests of 
another.188
Two problems arise from defining malicious to include acts that involve any 
degree of wrongfulness. First, allowing any degree of wrongfulness to satisfy 
the “malicious” term in § 523(a)(6) makes the term itself meaningless because 
wrongful acts are already encompassed by “willful” injuries. This is because it 
is inherently wrong to deliberately or intentionally injure another. In order for 
the “malicious” modifier of injury to have separate significance, it must mean 
something that is not already encompassed by the term “willful.”
The second reason malicious should not be defined as acts involving any 
degree of wrongfulness goes to the nature of an exception to discharge under 
bankruptcy law. From a policy perspective, an exception to discharge should 
not be interpreted in a way that results in the exception applying to all debts.189
The exceptions to discharge in § 523 demonstrate a congressional decision that 
the interests of certain creditors in recovering debt payment outweigh the 
interests of debtors in obtaining a fresh start.190
                                                                                                                     
187 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 472 (1978); see H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86 (Paul Craig ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“Rules are conceived and spoken of 
as imposing obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social 
pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great. Such rules 
may be wholly customary in origin: there may be no centrally organized system of 
punishments for breach of the rules; the social pressure may take only the form of a general 
diffused hostile or critical reaction which may stop short of physical sanctions. It may be 
limited to verbal manifestations of disapproval or of appeals to the individuals’ respect for 
the rule violated; it may depend heavily on the operation of feelings of shame, remorse, and 
guilt.”).
188 JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 331–32 (1992) (stating losses are wrongful 
if they result from conduct harmful of legitimate interests and that wrongdoing consists of 
unjustifiable departures from the relevant standards of permissible behavior). From a moral 
basis, Professor H.L.A. Hart suggested rules that are essential to the survival of any society 
are “those forbidding, or at least restricting, the free use of violence, rules requiring certain 
forms of honesty and truthfulness in dealings with others, and rules forbidding the 
destruction of tangible things or their seizure from others.” HART, supra note 187, at 171–
72 (acknowledging that moral rules “may vary from society to society or within a single 
society at different times”).
189 Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (interpreting a different exception to 
discharge and noting that one of the litigant’s proposed interpretations “would have left but 
few debts on which the law [meaning a discharge of debt] could operate”).
190 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998) (“The various exceptions to discharge 
in § 523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress ‘that the creditors’ interest in 
recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors’ interest in a 
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The exceptions to discharge in § 523 can be divided into two categories: 
those based on the debt’s importance to society and those based on a debtor’s
bad conduct. Examples of debts that are important to society include debts 
relating to taxes,191 domestic-support obligations,192 government fines,193
educational loans,194 and orders of restitution in criminal cases.195 The very 
nature of these debts is significant enough to outweigh both the public and 
private interests in providing debtors a fresh start. Examples of exceptions that 
arise from certain types of bad conduct by a debtor include debts obtained by 
false pretenses or actual fraud,196 embezzlement,197 or larceny.198 The exception 
to discharge for “willful and malicious injury” in § 523(a)(6) is based on the bad 
conduct of the debtor. As such, the bad conduct should be bad enough to justify 
the debt being excepted from discharge, not just conduct that involves any 
degree of wrongfulness. 
Debtor conduct that involves a degree of wrongfulness that is minor, 
tolerable, or expected should not be considered malicious. In other words, 
slightly wrongful conduct should still be discharged in bankruptcy. A criminal 
law scholar distinguished wrongful conduct from wrongdoing by explaining that 
“[m]urder and larceny are equally wrongful in the same way that both violate 
legal norms. But murder is a greater wrong—a graver case of wrongdoing—
than larceny. Determining the degree of wrongdoing is obviously a subtle 
problem of moral judgment.”199
Courts should stop defining malicious to require a mere “wrongful act”
because doing so prevents the term from performing its sorting function. 
Instead, malicious in § 523(a)(6) should require an “extraordinarily wrongful 
                                                                                                                     
complete fresh start.’” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991))); Bruning v.
United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (noting the predecessor to section 523(a) “[was] not 
a compassionate section for debtors” because “it demonstrate[d] congressional judgment that 
certain problems . . . override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start”); see also
Jonathon S. Byington, The Fresh Start Canon, 69 FLA. L. REV. 115, 117 (2017) (describing 
a rival policy to the fresh start, that “discharge of debt is a selectively conferred privilege” 
and that the Bankruptcy Code “manifests the ‘discharge restrictions’ policy through 
provisions that deny a debtor a discharge altogether under § 727(a) or except specific, 
individual debts from discharge under § 523(a)”).
191 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012) (certain tax debts cannot be discharged).
192 Id. § 523(a)(5) (certain domestic support obligations cannot be discharged).
193 Id. § 523(a)(7) (certain governmental fines cannot be discharged).
194 Id. § 523(a)(8) (certain educational loans cannot be discharged).
195 Id. § 523(a)(13) (certain orders of restitution cannot be discharged).
196 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A) (“A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt . . . for money, property, [or] services . . . to the extent obtained by false pretenses,
a false representation, or actual fraud . . . .”).
197 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (“A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt . . . for . . . embezzlement . . . .”).
198 Id. (“A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . for . . . larceny.”).
199 FLETCHER, supra note 187, at 458.
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act.”200 This standard would allow the definition of malicious to exclude acts 
that have a small degree of wrongfulness. Debts arising from such minimally 
wrongful acts, even where the injury was intended by the debtor, should still be 
discharged. To hold otherwise would except from discharge a mere willful 
injury instead of the required willful and malicious injury. Whether an act is 
extraordinarily wrongful should be assessed from an objective standard.201
Requiring an extraordinarily wrongful act changes the focus of the sorting 
function. It centers the analysis on whether an act has a substantial degree of 
wrongfulness instead of the unhelpful standard of whether an act was merely 
wrong or not. Interpreting the term in this manner gives separate meaning to 
both of the adjectives in § 523(a)(6): willful and malicious. It also allows the 
exception to discharge to properly perform its sorting function.
C. The Definition of Malicious Should Retain the Attributive Function of 
the Requirement That the Act Be “Without Just Cause or Excuse”
The final element of the Tinker definition of malicious requires the wrongful 
act be done “without just cause or excuse.”202 This element relates to attribution. 
Attribution is about whether a person is responsible for their wrongful conduct. 
In criminal law, a person may have engaged in wrongful conduct but because 
they are insane or an infant they may not be accountable for an offense.203 A
privilege like self-defense is another example of attribution.204 In limited 
situations, wrongful acts may be justified to avoid some other injury. The 
portion of the Tinker Court’s definition of malicious that relates to whether there 
was just cause or excuse goes to attribution and should be retained.
IV. CONCLUSION
The definition of malicious in § 523(a)(6) needs to change. In order to 
harmonize the Tinker Court’s definition of malicious with the Kawaauhau 
Court’s definition of willful, courts should stop construing malicious to require 
intent. This means the “done intentionally” element of the Tinker Court’s
definition of malicious should be eliminated. In addition, the “wrongful act”
                                                                                                                     
200 There is a precedential basis for a judicial adoption of this elevated standard. In 
determining whether a debtor’s acts were sufficiently wrongful, the Davis Court suggested 
the wrongful act needs to have “aggravated features.” Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 
U.S. 328, 333 (1934). 
201 See supra Part II.B.1 (stating that determination of whether an act is wrongful is made 
from an objective perspective, not a subjective one). For a discussion on whether the 
“willful” requirement in § 523(a)(6) is assessed with an objective or subjective standard, see 
Norberg, supra note 91, at 182–84.
202 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485–86 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser (1825), 
107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1054, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 255).
203 FLETCHER, supra note 187, at 455.
204 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
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element of the Tinker Court’s definition of malicious should be changed to 
require an “extraordinarily wrongful act.” This adjustment allows the term to 
perform its sorting function. Accordingly, the term “malicious” in § 523(a)(6) 
should require an extraordinarily wrongful act that is done without just cause or 
excuse.
